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Kentucky's New Rules of Professional
Conduct for Lawyers
By EUGENE R.

GAETKE**

INTRODUCTION

On July 12, 1989,1 the Kentucky Supreme Court 2 adopted its

own version of the American Bar Association's 1983 Model Rules
of Professional Conduct 3 as the body of disciplinary law applicable
to lawyers practicing in the state. These new rules constitute a
major improvement in the state's law of legal ethics. Their adoption
should be considered a victory for Kentucky lawyers and, more
importantly, a victory for the people of the state, the ultimate
4
beneficiaries of the regulation of the legal profession.

** W.L. Matthews, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
B.A. 1971, J.D. 1974, University of Minnesota. The author would like to thank Kathryn
A. Baird, J.D., 1990, for her helpful research, careful editorial assistance, and thoughtful
comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
Order of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, In re Order Amending Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RCr), Rules of Civil Procedure (CR), and Rules of the Supreme Court (SCR)
89-1, entered July 12, 1989 [hereinafter Order of the Kentucky Supreme Court].
2 Justice Vance dissenting. Id. at 106.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] reprinted in T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, 1990 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmnyrrv 82 (1990). Kentucky's new rules became effective on January 1, 1990. Order
of the Kentucky Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 2.
4 To the extent the adoption of the new Model Rules in the state of Kentucky is a
victory for the public and the bar, much of the credit should be given my colleague, Richard
H. Underwood. Professor Underwood served as the chair of the special committee of the
Kentucky Bar Association assigned the task of considering the new rules for adoption in
the state. In that capacity Professor Underwood persevered against all of the obstacles that
characteristically arise in the face of proposed legal reform. Throughout the committee
meetings, informational meetings with bar groups, discussions with the state supreme court,
drafts of alternatives, and other tasks, Professor Underwood persisted with the conviction
that the law of legal ethics in the state was important for the people of Kentucky, that the
existing law needed improvement, and that the Model Rules were the best device for securing
that improvement. The people of the state, lawyers included, owe Professor Underwood
much for his tireless efforts.
The report of Professor Underwood's committee to the state bar association reflects a
serious consideration of the Model Rules by the entire committee. See REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER ADOPTION OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
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As with most victories, the adoption of the new rules was not
unequivocally positive. Kentucky's version of the Model Rules
deviates in several substantial and detracting ways from the ABA's
version. Worse, the Kentucky court deleted certain duties of lawyers that for the better part of this century have been widely
accepted as fundamental components of legal ethics.
The new Kentucky rules take a large step forward in improving
the law regulating lawyers in the state. At the same time, they take
several significant steps backward. While the adoption of the new
rules should be applauded, their shortcomings need to be remedied.
I.

BACKGROUND

The 1983 Model Rules are the latest of three sets of ethical
standards issued by the ABA during this century. Each set in turn
has been adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court.5
In 1946, the court adopted as "persuasive authority ' 6 the 1908
Canons of Professional Ethics, the ABA's first effort at codifying
the ethical standards of the profession. 7 The Canons consisted of
thirty-two8 norms for the practice of law based on the earliest
statements of legal ethics.9
Because of the difficulty in enforcing the aspirational and
precatory language of the Canons, 10 the ABA's House of Delegates

CONDUCT OR TO CONSIDER REvISIONS OF THE 1969 CODE (March, 1986) [hereinafter REPORT
OF THE KBA SPECIAL COmmITTEE]. In a number of instances, the report contains additional
comments adding explanation for the changes made. See, e.g., id. at 10-11 (Chairman's
Comment to Rule 1.4). Unfortunately these comments were not reflected in the Kentucky
Supreme Court's product.
I The earliest effort at codifying legal ethics in Kentucky, however, was apparently
one made by the state bar association at its second annual meeting in 1903. A code of
ethics [hereinafter 1903 KBA CODE] consisting of 55 statements was adopted by the organization. It is reprinted in an early edition of the Kentucky Law-Journal. See Code of Legal
Ethics Adopted By the Kentucky State Bar Association, 3 Ky. L.J. 12 (1914).
6 Ky. CT. App. R. 3.170 (May 14, 1946).
" CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs (1908) [hereinafter 1908 CANONS] reprinted in T.
MOROAN & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 3, at 416.
1 Between 1908 and the adoption of the Code in 1970, 15 additional Canons were
added by the ABA. T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 3, at 416.
9 The 1908 Canons are generally viewed to be derived from Alabama's 1887 effort,
the nation's first codification of the ethical obligations of lawyers. See C. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETlIcs 54 n.21 (1986). Alabama's code is purported to have had its origins
in the work of George Sharswood in his Essay in Professional Ethics. Jones, Canons of
ProfessionalEthics, Their Genesis and History, 7 NOTRE DAME LAW. 483, 494 (1932).
10 Professor Wolfram notes:
The Canons were not originally adopted in order to serve as a regulatory

HeinOnline -- 78 Ky. L.J. 768 1989-1990

1989-901

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

approved the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) in 1969.11
The Kentucky Supreme Court immediately 12 adopted the Code in
its rules as "a sound statement of the standards of professional

conduct required of members of the bar."' 3
The Code was not without its problems. The ABA amended
the Code every year between 1974 and 198014 in response to judicial
and scholarly criticism.' 5 By 1977, dissatisfaction with the Code
warranted the appointment of a committee to consider its modifi-

blueprint for enforcement through disbarment and suspension actions. Instead,
they seem to have been a statement of professional solidarity - an assertion
by elite lawyers in the ABA of the legitimacy of their claim to professional
stature. (footnote omitted)
C. WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at 54. Other writers have noted the regulatory difficulty
presented by the 1908 Canons. See, e.g., Sutton, Re-Evaluation of the Canons of Professional Ethics: A Reviser's Viewpoint, 33 TEtN. L. REv. 132 (1965-66); Wright, The Code
of Professional Responsibility: Its History and Objectives, 24 AR.c. L. Rv.1, 3-5 (197071).
" C. WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at 56.
,2The Code was adopted by the ABA's House of Delegates in August, 1969, and
carried an effective date of January 1, 1970. Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the
Code for use in the regulation of lawyers in the state on November 11, 1969, nearly two
months before that effective date. Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.130, adopted by order of the Supreme
Court of Kentucky, November 11, 1969.
," Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.130, adopted by order of the Supreme Court of Kentucky,
November 11, 1969. By 1972, all but three states (California, Illinois, and Maine) had
adopted the Code. C. WOLRAM,supra note 9, at 56. At least one author has concluded
that all 50 states have based their ethical rules, at least in part, on the Code. See A.
KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PRoFEssIoNAL REspoNsmrrY 29 (1976).
14 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSrlLiTY DR 7-102(B)(1) (amended
1974); DR 2-103 (amended 1975); DR 2-102 (amended 1976); DR 2-105 (amended 1977);
DR 2-101 (amended 1978); DR 2-102 (amended 1979); DR 3-102 (amended 1980) [hereinafter
CODE].

In Kentucky, the court retained the original 1969 version of the Code and adopted
none of the ABA amendments to it. See Kentucky Bar Assn. v. Wilkey, No.80-SC-671-KB,
slip op. at 3-4 (Ky. Dec. 16, 1980) (unpublished). The court did, however, promulgate its
own special rules on advertising, Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.135, group legal plans, KY. Sup. CT.
R. 3.475, prepaid legal services plans, Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.476, and the unauthorized practice
of law, Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.470.
,sJudicial criticism of the Code occurred primarily in litigation challenging the constitutionality of restrictions on advertising and solicitation. See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191 (1982) (truthful, nondeceptive listing of areas of practice is protected speech under
first and fourteenth amendments and DR 2-105's prohibition to the contrary is unconstitutional); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (solicitation by mail for purposes of furthering
a political or social cause is protected speech under first and fourteenth amendments and
DR 2-103's prohibition to the contrary is unconstitutional); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350 (1977) (truthful newspaper advertising of the availability and terms of routine
legal services is protected commercial speech under the first and fourteenth amendments
and DR 2-101's prohibition to the contrary is unconstitutional).
Scholarly criticism of the Code is summarized in C. WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at 60-
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cation or abandonment. 16 The ABA's Kutak Commission 17 labored
through several years of drafts, comments, and suggested alternatives in proposing to the House of Delegates a replacement for the
Code. 8 The resulting Model Rules were approved by the ABA
House of Delegates in 1983.19
State reaction to the Model Rules has not been as swift or as
universally positive as was reaction to the Code. 20 To date, the
Model Rules have been adopted in full or substantial part in thirtythree states. 21 Kentucky's adoption of these rules, therefore, places

the state among the majority of jurisdictions using the ABA's new
product.22 An additional three jurisdictions 3 have before their supreme courts bar recommendations for the adoption of the Model

Rules, and another two states 24 have modified their Code-based

rules to incorporate concepts borrowed from the Model Rules.

Four states have expressly declined adoption of the Model Rules.2Y

16 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT xxx (1985). The committee was designated by the ABA
as the Special Commission on Professional Standards. Id.; C. WOLmAM, supra note 9, at
60-61.
61 The Commission was popularly named for its chairman, Robert J. Kutak, a lawyer

from Omaha, Nebraska. 0. HAzARD & W. HODES, supra note 16, at xxx; C. WOLFRAM,
supra note 9, at 61 n.72.
" A history of the adoption of the Model Rules is contained in ABA CmNR FOR
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Tan LEOISLATrrE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES oF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HousE OF DELEGATES (1987) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES LEGIS. HiST.]. Further brief discussion of the adoption process is found in
G. HAzARD & W. HODES, supra note 16, at xxix-xxxi and C. WOlvRAM, supra note 9, at
60-63.
", MODEL RULES LEGIS. HIST., supra note 18, at 1-2.
10 C. WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at 62-63. The first state to adopt the Model Rules, in
substantial part, was New Jersey. Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 1 Current
Reports No. 14, at 334 (July 25, 1984) [hereinafter ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL].
21See ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL at 01:3-01:4.
2 Kentucky was the thirty-first state to adopt the Model Rules. See id. at 01:3-4;
ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 20, 5 Current Reports No. 14, at 240 (Aug. 2,
1989).
, ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 20, 3 Current Reports No. 14, at 247
(Aug. 5, 1987) (Ala.); Id. 2 Current Reports No. 83, at 461 (Dec. 10, 1986) (D.C.); Id. 1
Current Reports No. 40, at 881 (July 24, 1985) (ILL.). Additionally, the rules have been
adopted for use by lawyers in the United States Army, while similar adoption is pending in
the other military services. Id., 3 Current Reports No. 22, at 392 (Nov. 25, 1987).
2, ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 20, 1 Current Reports No. 47, at 1026
(Oct. 30, 1985) (N.C.); Id. 1 Current Reports No. 48, at 1047 (Nov. 13, 1985) (Ore.).
See ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 20, at 01:3 (Cal.); ABA/BNA
LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 20, 4 Current Reports No. 4, at 77 (Mar. 16, 1988) (Mass.);
Id. 1 Current Reports No. 39, at 856 (July 10, 1985) (Vt.); Id. 1 Current Reports No. 48,
at 1047 (Nov. 13, 1985) (N.Y.).
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Thus, it is apparent that the law of legal ethics will be substantially
more balkanized in the future than it was under the prior Code,
which will make interstate law practice more complex.2
The Model Rules differ from the prior Code drastically in form
and significantly in substance. The troublesome Code format of
Canons,27 Ethical Considerations,2 and Disciplinary Rules 29 is
abandoned in the Model Rules.30 Instead, the ABA uses in its new
rules a form similar to that of the various Restatements produced
by the American- Law Institute, 3 in which the rules are stated
concisely, followed by comments intended to illuminate the provisions' interpretation and application. 32 This format is both familiar
to lawyers, who will look to the Model Rules for guidance, and
easier for laypersons who might venture into the subject of legal
ethics. Furthermore, the elimination of the Code's triplet of ethical
statements should dissuade courts from continuing their disquieting
tendency to discipline lawyers for conduct meant only to be dis33
couraged rather than prohibited.

6 See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at 62-63.
" The Canons under the Code were "statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in
general terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships
with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the
general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary Rules are
derived." CODE, Preliminary Statement 2. The Canons served primarily as the headings to
the various divisions of the Code's Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules.
21 The Code's Ethical Considerations [hereinafter EC] were "aspirational in character
and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive."
CODE, Preliminary Statement. Thus, the ABA did not intend the EC's to be standards to
be utilized in the discipline of lawyers.
19Disciplinary Rules [hereinafter DR] under the Code were "mandatory in character"
and were intended to "state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall
without being subject to disciplinary action." CODE, Preliminary Statement.
Thus, according to the ABA's tripartite Code arrangement of ethical statements, under
a given Canon pertaining to a general topic of legal ethics would be found the EC's giving
guidance and the DR's providing the minimum level of expected conduct in that topic area.
-oThe first action taken by the ABA House of Delegates at the January 1982 Midyear
Meeting on the Kutak Commission's work was the approval of the Restatement-like format
for the new rules. MODEL RULES LEois. HisT., supra note 18, at 1.
11See, e.g., REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CONTRACTS (1979).
32 The rules are of two types. MODEL RULEs, Scope. Most are mandatory in nature
and define the minimum level of conduct that is required of lawyers. See, e.g., MODEL

RULE 3.2 ("A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the
interests of the client."). These rules serve as the basis for discipline. Other rules are
permissive in nature and describe areas of lawyer discretion. See, e.g., MODEL RULE 1.2(c)
("A lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if the client consents after

consultation."). The comments, on the other hand, "do not add obligations to the Rules
but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules." MODEL RuLEs, Scope.
11For further discussion of some courts' use of the Code's Ethical Considerations
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The substantive improvement offered by the ABA's Model
Rules is more significant.3 4 Most notably, the Model Rules' treat-

ment of the difficult and subtle area of conflicts of interest is
clearer35 and more comprehensive 6 than that offered in the Code.
The Model Rules also set forth the ethical duties of supervisory
and subordinate lawyers within firms.3 7 Additionally, the new rules
expressly approve of representations that are mediative rather than
adversarial, 38 a topic not broached by the Code.3 9 The Model Rules
also improve the Code's treatment of referral fees, 40 legal opinions

and even its Canons as the basis for imposing discipline upon lawyers despite the contrary
intent of the drafters of the Code, see infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
14 For a more detailed comparison of the relative merits of the Code and the Model
Rules, see Gaetke, Why Kentucky Should Adopt the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 74 Ky. L.J. 581, 584 (1986).
11 In the area of simultaneous multiple representations, Model Rule 1.7 focuses on
the degree of adversity between the two clients sought to be represented and on the
limitations upon the representation of either that would be caused by the multiple representation. MODEL RULES 1.7(a), (b). Exceptions to the restriction on multiple representation
are confined to situations in which the lawyer reasonably concludes that the representation
would not be adversely affected and the clients consent after adequate consultation. Id. The
Code's treatment of simultaneous multiple representation created a broad prohibition on
such employment. CODE, DR 5-105(A)-(B) (A lawyer should not accept or continue employment whenever the lawyer's "independent professional judgment in behalf of a client
will be or is likely to be adversely affected" or "if it would be likely to involve him in
representing differing interests."). The Code provided an exception to that broad prohibition
when the lawyer secured client consent after full disclosure and it was also "obvious" that
he or she could adequately represent the interest of each client. CODE, DR 5-105(C). The
"obvious" standard, however, provides little guidance for a lawyer confronted with multiple
representation. As one commentator has noted, it is "a standard which is both so strict
and so ambiguous that in avoiding multiple representation the lawyer can never be wrong."
Morgan, The Evolving Concept of ProfessionalResponsibility, 90 HARv. L. REv. 702, 72728 (1977). Professor Wolfram argues that the Model Rules treatment of multiple representation continues the Code treatment of the subject but does so in a clearer fashion. C.
WOLFPAm, supra note 9, at 350.
16 The Model Rules treat a number of conflict of interest issues not covered by the
Code. Model Rule 1.9 governs representations adverse to former clients, a topic not directly
addressed by the Code. The problem of successive private and government employment is
covered more completely in Model Rule 1.11 than in the Code's DR 9-101(B). The same
can be said for the Model Rules' restrictions on former judges and arbitrators in private
practice. Compare MODEL RULE 1.12 with DR 9-101(A). The Model Rules' treatment of
conflicts generated by the lawyer's own interests contains several prohibitions that were not
contained in the Code. See, e.g., MODEL RULE 1.8(c), (e)(2), (i).
17 See MODEL RULES 5.1, 5.2.
1' See MODEL RUtL 2.2.
39The Code's only express recognition of lawyers serving in the capacity of mediator
is in EC 5-20, which noted that a "lawyer is often asked to serve as an impartial arbitrator
or mediator in matters which involve present or former clients. He may serve in either
capacity if he first discloses such present or former relationships." CODE, EC 5-20.
40 The Model Rules permit pure referral fees, unrelated to the work actually done by
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for third parties, 41 advertising, 42 solicitation, 43 and dealing with
clients suffering disabilities. 44
The Model Rules are not without their faults. 45 A number of
states have amended the ABA's treatment of certain issues, most

the referring lawyer, if the lawyers assume joint responsibility for the work done in the
representation, the client agrees to the referral in writing under those terms, and the total
fee is reasonable. MODEL RuLE 1.5(e). The Code, on the other hand, required the division
to be made "in proportion to the services performed and responsibility assumed by each"
lawyer. DR 2-107(A)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the Code approves of referral fees only
when the fee reflects actual work done on the matter. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at
512.
" Model Rule 2.3 permits lawyers to render such opinions under certain circumstances.
While there was no direct counterpart to this provision in the Code, DR 4-101(B)'s restrictions on the disclosure of client confidences and secrets presumably would prohibit the
rendering of most opinions to third persons in the absence of client consent.
42 Regulation of advertising under the Model Rules is primarily focused on the
truthfulness of the communication. MODEL Rur.Es 7.1, 7.2. The Code's approach was to
list appropriate categories of information that could be utilized in advertisements. See CODE,
DR 2-101(B). The Model Rules treatment of the subject is more consistent with the
developing body of case law from the United States Supreme Court on the topic of lawyer
advertising than is the Code's. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsef, 471 U.S.
626 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191; Bates, 433 U.S. 350.
," Solicitation is governed by Model Rule 7.3, which was amended by the ABA
following the Supreme Court's decision in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 486 U.S.
466 (1988). In that case the Court found mail solicitation directed to potential clients known
to be in need of certain legal services to be commercial speech protected by the first
amendment even when the lawyer's motive was pecuniary gain. Id. at 475-76. The Code's
broad prohibition of solicitation is contained in DR 2-103.
" Model Rule 1.14 pertains to the difficult problem of representing clients suffering
from some type of impairment. Under the rule, lawyers are expected to maintain as normal
a lawyer-client relationship as possible in such representations. MODEL RUtLE 1.14(a). The
Code, on the other hand, merely recognizes that impaired clients present additional responsibilities for their lawyers without providing further guidance. CODE, EC 7-12. See also EC
7-11 ("[Responsibilities of a lawyer may vary according to the intelligence, experience,
mental condition or age of a client.").
4" The Association of Trial Lawyers of America was sufficiently disappointed by the
Kutak Commission's drafts of the Model Rules that it adopted and offered as an alternative
its own rules of ethics. See Association of Trial Lawyers of America, A~miicAN LAWYER'S
CODE OF CONDuCT Preface (Revised Draft 1982) [hereinafter ATLA Code], reprinted in T.
MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 3, at 201. The group viewed the Model Rules as too
restrictive of the lawyer's duty as a zealous advocate on behalf of the client. Id.; C.
WOLFRAM,

supra note 9, at 62.

The ABA has itself amended the Model Rules since their adoption by the organization's
House of Delegates in 1983. During the Kentucky Supreme Court's consideration of the
rules, the ABA modified Model Rules 1.9, governing conflicts of interest with former
clients, and 1.10, pertaining to imputed disqualification. The modification merely rearranged
the provisions and their comments and did not change their cumulative substance. The
Kentucky court adopted the ABA's original version of the two rules. Compare MODEL
Ruus 1.9, 1.10, T. MORGAN & R. RoTUNDA, supra note 3, at 112-18, with KY. RULEs 1.9,
1.10.
Two new Model Rules were added to the ABA's mid-year meeting in February, 1990,
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frequently the provision on confidentiality. 46 A clear majority of
states, Kentucky now included, however, have recognized the substantial improvement offered by the Model Rules over the previous
Code.
II.

KENTUCKY'S CHANGES TO T=E

ABA's

MODEL

RULES

In adopting the Model Rules the Kentucky Supreme Court
chose to vary the language used by the ABA in a number of
instances. 47 These changes vary from the insignificant to the pronounced.
A.

The Less Significant Changes

Among the least significant changes made by the court are
several in which the ABA's language was altered slightly with no
apparent change in meaning. For example, the ABA's Model Rule
2.2 provides that a lawyer may serve more than one client in a

after the effective date of the new rules in Kentucky. The ABA inserted new Model Rule
3.8(f), restricting prosecutors' ability to subpoena defense counsel to testify against their
clients, and new Model Rule 1.17, governing lawyers selling their practices. See ABA/BNA
LAWYER's MANUAL, supra note 20, 6 Current Reports, at 25-27 (February 28, 1990). To be
applicable to lawyers practicing in Kentucky, these rules would need to be adopted by the
Kentucky Supreme Court.
The ABA also adopted new Model Rules 7.2(a) and 7.3 in response to the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Kentucky Bar Assn. v. Shapero, 486 U.S. 466 (1988), which
held the original treatment of direct mail solicitation to be unconstitutional. For further
discussion of the Kentucky court's treatment of advertising and solicitation, see infra note
146.
,' MODEL RUr 1.6. A number of states broadened the exceptions to the duty of
confidentiality beyond those provided in the ABA's treatment. See, e.g., ABA/BNA LAwYER's MANUAL, supra note 20, 3 Current Reports, at 203 (N.D.), 374 (Penn.); ABA/BNA
LAwYER'S MANA,, supra note 20, 2 Current Reports, at 14 (Nev.), 283 (Fl.), 494 (Ind.),
510 (Wy.). Within the ABA itself the adoption of the confidentiality rule involved considerable amendment to the language proposed by the Kutak Commission. See MODEL RULES
LEoIs. HisT., supra note 18, at 47-55.
For further discussion of the Kentucky Supreme Court's amendment to the Model
Rule provision on confidentiality, see infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
41 The American Bar Association's critical role in developing ethical standards for the
practice of law is less regulatory than advisory. The adoption of a collection of ethical
restraints by the ABA has itself only the nebulous effect of binding that organization's
membership. Those same restraints become legally enforceable, however, through their
adoption by the state supreme courts in their rulemaking capacity. See C. WoLR.AM, supra
note 9, at 56. As each state's highest court considers the body of regulations proposed by
the ABA, it frequently makes changes to the proffered codification. Amendments to the
proposed Model Rules by the states adopting them were made by virtually all states. See
supra note 46 and accompanying text. Kentucky, therefore, is not unusual in that it altered
the ABA's product.
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mediative capacity "if" three strict conditions are met. 48 Under the
Kentucky court's version of the rule, lawyers may engage in such
representations "only" if the same conditions are met. 49 Even
under the ABA's rule, such representations would be limited to
these instances because other efforts at serving as an intermediary
would violate Model Rule 1.7 on simultaneous multiple representation. 50 One might be tempted to infer from the Kentucky modification that the court views such representations restrictively and
as quite extraordinary. The Kentucky language, however, adds only
redundancy to the ABA version.
An equally superfluous alteration was made to Rule 1.5, which
lists relevant factors in determining the reasonableness of legal
fees. The ABA's version of the rule lists factors that are to be
included in the determination of reasonableness. 5' The Kentucky
court's version declares that the same list constitutes merely "some"
of the factors relevant to that determination. 52 Since the ABA list
of factors is expressly declared not to be exclusive, 53 the Kentucky
modification was wholly unnecessary. Under either version, any
information bearing on the reasonableness of a fee, whether or not
it relates to one of the express factors on the list, is appropriate
for consideration.
Another needless change was made to the ABA's language in
Rule 6.1 governing pro bono legal services. Despite initial efforts

4"MODEL

RuLE 2.2.

,1 KY. Sup. CT. R. 2.2 [hereinafter KY. RuLE]. The change was recommended without
further comment by the Special Committee. REPORT OF na KBA SPEcrAL COMMITTEE, supra
note 4, at 56.
" The intermediary role contemplated by Model Rule 2.2 is a particularly delicate one
in that the lawyer is representing all of the parties to the mediation. Obviously, such
representations present problems of conflicts of interest and confidentiality. Should any of
the three conditions set forth in Model Rule 2.2(a) pertaining to these problems not be met,
the lawyer's multiple representation by continuing in the mediation would violate Model
Rule 1.7. G. HAzARD & W. HODES, supra note 15, at 309-19. Thus, when the ABA's version
of the rule provides that lawyers may engage in such representations "if" the three conditions are met, it is effectively providing that a lawyer may do so "only if" those conditions
are met.
The Kentucky court also added a new paragraph to the comments to its Rule 2.2. The
new comment clarifies that a lawyer is not serving as an intermediary merely because one
client in a matter is unrepresented by counsel. Ky. RULE 2.2 comment (paragraph 6).
" MODEL Rutr
1.5(a).
nKy. RuLE 1.5(a). The Special Committee recommended the change. See REPORT OF
Tna KBA SPEc
CoanmE, supra note 4, at 11.
5 The ABA rule provides that "[t]he factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of a fee include the following" listed items. MODEL RuLE 1.5(a) (emphasis
added). By its use of the word "include" it is apparent that the ABA did not intend the
listed factors to be exclusive.
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by the Kutak Commission to make the provision of such legal
services mandatory for each lawyer 5 4 the ABA's rule as adopted
provides only that lawyers "should" render pro bono services. 5
The Kentucky court's version of the rule declares that lawyers in
the state are "encouraged to render" pro bono legal services. 56 A
cynic might conclude that the change evidences even less enthusiasm
for the imposition of an obligation to render those services than
shown by the ABA's House of Delegates.5 7 Since the ABA's language itself was merely exhortatory, however, the Kentucky change
is insignificant.
An equally unnecessary change was made to Rule 1.16, which
governs withdrawal of lawyers from representation of clients. The
ABA version of the rule allows withdrawing lawyers to retain client
papers to secure the payment of legal fees if that retention is
"permitted by other law." '5 8 Such a practice is recognized in many
jurisdictions as a retaining lien.5 9 Kentucky law does not provide
lawyers with this lien, 6° and the court's version of the rule reflects
this fact by deleting reference to lawyers' retention of client papers
upon withdrawal. 61 Arguably the change offers more clarity, but
the same result would have followed without altering the ABA's
62
version of the rule.

- The original Discussion Draft of the Model Rules contained a mandatory pro bono
obligation for lawyers. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1 (Discussion Draft)
reprintedin T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, 1980 CALIFORNIA RULEs SUPPLEMENT 142-43 (1980);
see also G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 16, at 491-492 (discussing Kutak Commission's
abandonment of mandatory pro bono rule).
"' MODEL RULE 6.1.
16 Ky. RULE 6.1. The change was not recommended by the Special Committee. See

REPORT OF THE KBA SPEcIAL COMMIT-EE, supra note 4, at 93.
1,Arguably the ABA's use of the word "should" in defining the profession's duty
can be read to express what is expected of lawyers, even though the rule does not impose
an enforceable obligation. The Kentucky court's substitution of the words "are encouraged
to" apparently reduces the rule to one of the court urging lawyers to do pro bono work
without stating their expectation that it be done. Under either rule, however, since there is
no enforceable duty to engage in such work, the practical effect likely would be the same.
58
'

MODEL RULE 1.16(d).

See C. WoLFRAM, supra note 9, at 559-61.

60 The only lien provided lawyers by the state legislature is that found in KY. REv.

STAT. § 376.460 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter KRS], which would
be categorized generally as a "charging" lien. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at 561-62.
61 Ky. RULE 1.16(d). The Special Committee recommended the change. See REPORT
OF THE KBA SPEcIAL COMmTrEE, supra note 4, at 52.
61 Since the ABA rule permits the retention of client papers only "to the extent
permitted by other law," MODEL RULE 1.16(d), and since Kentucky law does not provide
for such retention, Ky. REv. STAT. § 376.460, the ABA rule would protect clients against
such retention as fully as the Kentucky version of the rule.
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Another change that has no apparent effect on the meaning set
forth by the ABA version was made by the Kentucky court to Rule
3.8 governing the conduct of prosecutors. The ABA's version is
applicable to prosecutors "in a criminal case." 63 Kentucky's version
of the rule deletes that language and inserts "at all stages of a
proceeding." 64 Obviously, criminal cases are the proceedings likely
to involve prosecutors, and since the ABA's wording would apparently make the duties stated in that rule mandatory throughout
the entire criminal case as well, the Kentucky modification has no
substantive impact.
One final change that was clearly unnecessary was made to
Rule 3.3, which governs candor to tribunals. 65 The Kentucky court
added language declaring that lawyers' obligations under the rule
are "subordinate to such constitutional requirements as may be
announced by the courts." 6 The modification merely states the
obvious, since all other law, whether legislative or judicial, is
subordinate to the dictates of the constitution. 67
Two changes made by the Kentucky court merely make explicit
in the rules what was implicit in the ABA's version. The Kentucky
court's modification of Rule 1.6, governing lawyer-client confidentiality, 68 falls in this category. The Kentucky version of the rule
adds a third exception to the general prohibition on the disclosure
of information relating to the representation of a client. 69 Kentucky's Rule 1.6(b)(3) makes it permissible to reveal that information
"to comply with other law or a court order." ' 70 While the ABA

63 MODEL

RuLE 3.8.

Ky. RuLE 3.8. The Special Committee recommended the change, REPORT oF Tm
KBA SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 4, at 78, noting only that the amendment was "selfexplanatory." Id. at 80.
64

"MODEL
6Ky.

KBA

RULE

3.3.

Ru 3.3(e). The Special Committee recommended the change, REPORT oF

SPECIAL COMMn-rEE,

THm

supra note 4, at 65, indicating that several committee members

had urged the addition of the new subsection (e)to the rule. Id. at 70.
61 C. WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at 57.
61

As noted above, the ABA rule on confidentiality was one of the most controversial

of the Kutak Commission's proposed rules and continues to be controversial in the process
of adoption by the state supreme courts. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
0 The ABA's rule permits lawyers to disclose confidential information to prevent
clients from committing violent crimes and in disputes regarding the lawyer's services.
MODEL RuLE 1.6(b)(1)-(2). In addition, of course, disclosure is permitted with the consent
of the client. MODEL RuLE 1.6(a).
70 Ky. RuIn 1.6(b)(3). The Special Committee recommended this amendment. See
REPORT OF THE KBA SPECIAL COMMITTE, supra note 4, at 16. That committee also
recommended, however, that the lawyer's permissive disclosure under the new exception be
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version of the rule made no such exception, the comments to the

rule cautioned lawyers that that they "must comply with the final
order of a court or other tribunal ' 71 requiring them to disclose
information about their clients and recognized that such disclosures
also could be compelled by law other than the rules. 72 Thus, the
Kentucky version incorporates in the rule's express language the
interpretation urged by the ABA's comments.73 The Kentucky rule

is preferable, 74 but it does not alter the likely practical effect of
the ABA rule.
An additional modification by the Kentucky court merely ex-

presses clearly what was implicit in the ABA's Model Rules. A
lawyer is prohibited by the ABA's and Kentucky's Model Rule
5.4(b) from forming a "partnership" for the practice of law with
a non-lawyer. 75 The Kentucky version adds a new comment making
clear that "partnership" includes other forms of business associa' 76
tions, such as "joint ventures, corporations, and conglomerates.
Given the ABA House of Delegates' negative reaction to any form

of law practice in which lay persons share in the profits and
management of the enterprise, 77 it is likely that the ABA version

of the rule implicitly incorporated a similarly broad view of "part-

exercised only "after good faith efforts to challenge the law or court order have been
exhausted." Id. The latter restriction, however, was not adopted by the court in its version
of the rule. See Ky. RULE 1.6(b)(3).
The Kutak Commission's proposed rule on confidentiality initially contained an exception to the duty of nondisclosure "to comply with other law." See MODEL RULEs LEGIS.
HisT., supra note 18, at 48.
7' MODEL RULE 1.6 comment [19].
72 MODEL

RULE 1.6 comment [20].

71 For further discussion of the relationship between the Model Rules and the com-

ments, see infra note 87 and accompanying text.
'4 Professor Wolfram notes that the ABA version of Model Rule 1.6 is "confusing"
and "contradictory" in its treatment of confidentiality. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at 723.
He prefers the earlier version of Model Rule 1.6, which permitted disclosures when compelled
by other law. Id. at 724. He criticizes the present ABA rule because it is "absurd to put a
lawyer into the position of having to choose between violating a professional obligation or
a duty imposed by other valid law." Id. at 672. Presumably, therefore, Professor Wolfram
would view the Kentucky court's amendment to that rule as a significant improvement.
71 MODEL RULE 5.4(b); Ky. RULE 5.4(b).
76 Ky. RULE 5.4(b) comment [2]. The Special Committee recommended the change.
See REPORT OF a KBA SPEciAL CoMrm=E, supra note 4, at 90.
The rule proposed by the Kutak Commission, which permitted nonlawyer managerial authority in law firms, was the only proposed Model Rule rejected in its entirety by
the ABA House of Delegates. G. HAzARD & W. HODES, supra note 16, at 469-72. The
evolution of Model Rule 5.4 is set forth in MODEL RUinS LEOis. HIST., supra note 18, at
159-64.
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nership" as well. The Kentucky comment adds clarity but does not
7
change the substance of the rule. 1
Finally, the Kentucky court chose not to incorporate the ABA
Model Rules' preamble when it adopted the new rules.7 9 While that
deletion does not affect the text of the Model Rules, it could be

of some importance. The preamble serves two functions. First, it
describes in narrative form the ABA's view of a lawyer's respon-

sibilities to clients, courts, and society. 0 The description explains
in broad terms the conflicting pressures on lawyers' and offers the
policy justification for self-regulation of the profession. 2 It is,
therefore, instructive both to the bar and to the public. Second,
and more importantly for the regulation of lawyers' conduct, the
preamble describes the scope of the Model Rules.83
The preamble sets forth several important principles for the

application of the rules. It indicates that while violations of the
rules provide the basis for discipline, the sanction imposed, if any,
should be determined by a careful consideration of all the circumstances, including mitigating factors.84 Additionally, it notes that
violations of the Model Rules were not intended to be viewed as
giving rise to a private cause of action,85 although understandably
they have been found by several courts to be relevant to the
8 6
litigation of civil duties.
Most importantly, the preamble notes the intended relationship
between the rules and comments. The language of the rules is to
be viewed as authoritative while the comments are offered as
"guides to interpretation.' '87 If followed by the courts and disci78 The Kentucky court made an additional change to Model Rule 5.4. The ABA rule
prohibits lawyers from practicing for profit in a professional corporation in which a
nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer. MODEL RuLE 5.4(d)(2). The Kentucky version
of the rule deletes this provision. Ky. RuLE 5.4(d). The Special Committee recommended
this deletion without comment. REPORT OF THE KBA SPEcAL ComMITTE, supra note 4, at
90.

, The preamble can be found in T.

MORGAN

& R.

ROTUNDA,

supra note 3, at 84-88.

10 The first portion of the preamble is entitled "A Lawyer's Responsibilities." Id. at
84.
" Id. at 85 (paragraph 8).
u Id. at 85 (paragraphs 9-11).
11 The second portion of the preamble is entitled "Scope." Id. at 86.
1,Id. at 87 (paragraph 5).
" Id. at 87 (paragraph 6). The previous Code of Professional Responsibility contained
a similar disclaimer. See Code Preliminary Statement, reprinted in T. MORGAN & R.
ROTUNDA,

supra note 3, at 3.

See C. WoLFRAM, supra note 9, at 51-53.
17

Model Rules, Preamble: Scope, T.

MORGAN

& R.

ROTUNDA,

(paragraph 1), 88 (paragraph 9).
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plinary bodies, this clarification would prevent the improper use

of the comments. The Code's Ethical Considerations, roughly analogous to the comments in the Model Rules, were also intended to
be used for guidance only but were incorrectly relied upon by a
number of courts,8 8 including Kentucky's,

discipline against

lawyers. 90

9

as a basis for imposing

While the deletion of the preamble

does not necessarily mean that the Kentucky courts will similarly

misuse the comments, its adoption would have been comforting
assurance.
B.

The Significant Changes

A number of changes made by the Kentucky Supreme Court
to the ABA's Model Rules are more substantial. Regrettably, with

two major exceptions, the most significant Kentucky amendments
to the Model Rules are less protective of clients, the judicial system,
and the public than the ABA's original version. Cumulatively, these

changes have altered the ABA's vision of a lawyer's responsibilities
in a manner that nearly exclusively favors lawyers.
One exception to this unfortunate tendency is Kentucky's Rule
3.4(f), which instructs a lawyer not to "present, participate in
presenting, or threaten to present criminal or disciplinary charges
solely to obtain an advantage" in other matters. 9' Although the

In re Disciplinary Action Against Prueter, 359 N.W.2d 613 (Minn. 1984) (lawyer
disciplined for violation of EC 5-5); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Behnke,
276 N.W.2d 838, 846 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 805 (1979) (lawyer disciplined for
violation of EC 5-5); Florida Bar v. Dawson, 318 So. 2d 385, 385, cert. denied, 423 U.S.
995 (1975) (lawyer disciplined for violation of EC 5-8); see also Note, Lawyer Disciplinary
Standards: Broad v. Narrow Proscriptions,65 IowA L. REv. 1386, 1387-88 (1979-80).
19 Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. DeCamillis, 547 S.W.2d 446, 447-48 (Ky. 1977) (lawyer
disciplined for violation of EC 5-1 and 5-2).
9 Indeed, in at least one case the Kentucky court relied upon mere Canons under the
Code as the sole legal reason for finding certain conduct to be inappropriate. See In re
Advisory Opinion of Kentucky Bar Association, 613 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. 1981) (lawyer who
represents police organization in grievance proceedings may not defend criminal accuseds
in the same jurisdiction under Canons 7 and 9 of the Code). The Canons under the Code,
it will be recalled, were mere statements of axiomatic norms used primarily as headings for
the various sections of disciplinary requirements. See supra note 27. For further discussion
of the use of Canons as the basis for discipline, see Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code
of Professional Responsibility?, 57 N.C. L. REv. 497, 514 (1978-79).
1, KY. RULE 3.4(f). Order of the Kentucky Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 73. The
addition of this provision was recommended by the Special Committee, although the
committee's addition was contained at Rule 3.4(g). See REPORT OF THE KBA SPECIAL
COMMITTE, supra note 4, at 70, 72.
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rule is similar to a proscription under the prior Code, 92 it has no
counterpart in the ABA's Model Rules. 93 Prohibitions on such
threats and actions, however, are justifiable on several grounds.
To the extent a threatened prosecution is used successfully to secure

a result in a civil matter, that prosecution will generally not occur.
Thus, the criminal justice system will be frustrated by the bar-

gained-for silence resulting from the civil matter. 94 Furthermore,
the use of threats of prosecution may well constitute an abusive
use of the criminal justice process itself and may even constitute a
tort in some jurisdictions. 95 The Kentucky rule, therefore, serves a
valuable public interest function in discouraging the misuse of
criminal and disciplinary charges for private gain. Its insertion is
an improvement upon the ABA's new Model Rules.
The Kentucky court also made a commendable change to the
ABA's version of Model Rule 8.4 by deleting the general prohibition on lawyers engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. 96 That deletion may signal a welcome end to the
court's consistent reliance on general catch-all language in disciplining lawyers even when specific rules prohibited the conduct at
issue. 97 That practice detracted from the court's effort at regulating

92 CODE, DR 7-105. It should be noted, however, that the Kentucky rule is broader
than DR 7-105, the previous Code provision, in two respects. First, the new Kentucky rule
prohibits the use or threat of use of the disciplinary process in addition to criminal process
to gain an advantage. Ky. RULE 3.4(0; Order of the Kentucky Supreme Court, supra note
1, at 73. It would seem that the same rationale for restricting the abuse of the criminal
justice system would apply to the disciplinary process as well. Second, however, the Kentucky
court inexplicably included a prohibition on the use of criminal charges or threats to use
criminal charges solely to gain an advantage in a "criminal matter." Surely the court did
not mean to prohibit the common use of criminal charges in plea bargaining and in obtaining
helpful testimony against other defendants, but the court's rule would seem to do so.
Professor Underwood, the chair of the Special Committee, noted in a comment that
the new rule was "not intended to hamper the prosecution in plea bargaining by prohibiting
additional charges for which there is probable cause." See REPORT OF THa KBA SPECIAL
ComrrTEE, supra note 4, at 72.
91 The ABA's Model Rule 3.4() prohibits certain efforts at silencing witnesses. MODEL
RuLE 3.4(f). The Kentucky court, however, deleted this provision. See infra notes 130-32
and accompanying text. In its place was inserted the court's prohibition on using criminal
and disciplinary proceedings to gain advantage in other matters. KY. RULE 3.4(f); Order of
the Kentucky Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 73.
94 C. WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at 716.
9 Id.
" Compare KY. RULE 8.3(d) with MODEL RuLE 8.4(d). The Special Committee did

not recommend the deletion. See

REPORT OF TnE

KBA

SPECIAL COMMTTEE,

supra note 4,

at 111.
97 This author has on two previous occasions criticized the Kentucky court for this
practice. See Gaetke, supra note 34, at 593-95; Gaetke, Solicitation and the UncertainStatus
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lawyers in two ways. It failed to offer lawyers guidance as to the
court's interpretation of the applicable ethical rules.93 It also kept
from the public information about the regulation of lawyers in the
state, thus undermining public confidence in the process. 99 Although the court's deletion of the catch-all language may be a
more drastic remedy than was needed, 100 it certainly should result
in the improvement of the lawyer discipline process in Kentucky.
With these exceptions, however, the court's other significant
changes to the Model Rules cannot be similarly applauded for they
cannot be justified by public interest concerns. For example, the
ABA's Model Rules place considerable emphasis upon the protection of clients in their relationships with lawyers. The rules particularly stress full communication with clients. This emphasis is
reflected in Model Rule 1.4, which requires lawyers to keep their
clients reasonably informed and to explain matters sufficiently to
permit clients to make informed decisions about their representation. 10' The Kentucky court, in contrast, eliminated these require-

of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility in Kentucky, 70 Ky. L.J. 707, 709-13, 722-28
(1981-82). Another author has offered the same criticism. See Van Booven, Kentucky Law
Survey-ProfessionalResponsibility, 73 Ky. L.J. 449, 454-58 (1984-85). To the extent that
the court is indicating an end to this practice by its deletion of the catch-all language of
the ABA's Model Rule 8.4(d), the amendment is a significant improvement.
The deletion, however, may be criticized for removing a valuable safety net for the
lawyer regulatory process. Certain unethical conduct of lawyers will undoubtedly fall outside
of the specific rules of professional conduct and, therefore, may go unpunished without a
catch-all provision such as Model Rule 8.4(d). It should be noted, however, that the court
adopted the other general misconduct provisions contained in the ABA's Model Rule 8.4,
including the prohibition on any dishonest or deceitful conduct, KY. RULE 8.3(c), and on
criminal acts adversely reflecting on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. KY. RUlE 8.3(b).
It is difficult to imagine misconduct that could be considered prejudicial to the administration of justice but that is not covered by a specific rule, does not involve dishonesty or
deceit, and is not criminal. If there is such misconduct it will likely not result in discipline
because of the Kentucky court's deletion of the ABA's Model Rule 8.4(d). Such instances,
however, should be extraordinarily rare.
For a general discussion of the limited value of broad ethical standards, see Note,
supra note 88.
" Gaetke, supra note 34, at 594; Gaetke, supra note 97, at 713.
" Gaetke, supra note 34, at 595.
110What has been objectionable about the Kentucky court's approach to legal ethics
has been its persistent use of catch-all provisions even when specific disciplinary standards
apply, not the mere presence of the catch-all provisions in the body of law governing legal
ethics. All that was necessary to remedy this problem was a commitment by the court to
use the specific disciplinary provisions and not to utilize the analytically easier route of
disciplining lawyers through the catch-all language unless it was necessary. The court's
deletion, therefore, goes further than was necessary to correct the problem.
10 MODEL RULE 1.4(a), (b).
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ments and merely encouraged lawyers to communicate with their

clients. 102
The ABA's Model Rules also require extensive consultation with
clients regarding fees, an area obviously critical to clients and the
focus of many complaints about lawyers. This duty was substantially
reduced through several changes made by the Kentucky court to
various fee provisions.0 3 Most noteworthy is the court's change to
Model Rule 1.5(b), which requires lawyers to communicate with their
clients about fees at an early point in their relationship.'0 4 The

Kentucky version renders such discussions optional. 105
'0 The Kentucky version substitutes "should" for "shall" in both requirements of
MODEL RuLr 1.4. Ky. RuLE 1.4(a), (b). The Special Committee recommended the changes.
REPORT OF THE KBA SPECIL COMMITTEE, supra note 4, at 9. The chair's comment explaining
the changes asserts that the ABA's version "provide[s] an independent, and highly technical,
ground for discipline," and that Rules 1.1 (requiring competent representation) and 1,3
(requiring diligence in representation) "provide adequate grounds for disciplinary action."
Id. at 10 (chairman's comment).
Certainly the ABA's version of the rule can be violated even though a lawyer's
representation is otherwise competent and rendered diligently. This emphasizes the importance placed by the ABA upon the lawyer's duty to keep the client informed. The Kentucky
rule relegates that duty to a lesser status. Furthermore, it is difficult to understand how
Rules 1.1 and 1,3 can provide adequate grounds for disciplinary action as a result of the
conduct governed by Rule 1.4 when that conduct is rendered optional by that rule.
"03 The Kentucky court made one change to the ABA's treatment of fees that in most
cases will be insignificant. In a rare instance, however, the change would favor the lawyer's
interests at the expense of the client's.
The change governs nonclient payment for legal representation. The ABA's Model Rule
1.8(0 permits such payments only when the client has agreed to them after consultation. MODEL
RuLE 1.8(0(1). The Kentucky court, however, added that such payments are also appropriate
when made "in accordance with an agreement between the client and the third party" payor.
Ky.RuLE 1.8(0(1). The Special Committee recommended this change. See REPORT OF =E KBA
SPECIA CommrrrEE, supra note 4, at 27. Apparently the committee and the court felt such an
amendment was necessary to indorse the common instance of insurers paying lawyers for
representing insured clients. See REmoRT OF Tim KBA SPECIAL CommrrrEE, supra note 4, at 31
(Committee Comment) (client consent is not required "if the client previously consented in an
agreement with a third party, such as an insurance contract").
Despite the frequency and the usual acceptability of that arrangement, however, the
amendment is disturbing in the rare instance of a client objecting to payment of counsel by
an insurer. Surely the client should have an opportunity to object to the lawyer's payment
by another source, even if the client has previously agreed to such an arrangement through
payment of insurance premiums. The ABA's requirement of consultation and consent assures
the client of that opportunity while the Kentucky version of the rule deletes it. Obviously,
such an objection would be extraordinary. That does not explain, however, why the client's
control over the payment of his own lawyer should not prevail.
Because the problem is not likely to arise with any frequency, however, the change
can likely be viewed as inconsequential.
", MODEL

RuLE 1.5(b).

,01
Again, the Kentucky version substitutes "should" for "shall" in this provision.
Ky. RutL 1.4(a), (b). This change was not recommended by the Special Committee. See
REPORT OF nm KBA SPEctAL ComrE,supra note 4, at 9-11.

HeinOnline -- 78 Ky. L.J. 783 1989-1990

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 78

The lawyer's duty of disclosure to clients regarding fees was
further diminished by the Kentucky court's amendment to the
factors listed as relevant to the determination of fee reasonableness.
The ABA's Model Rules include in those factors "the likelihood,
if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer."°6 The
requirement that this likelihood be apparent to the client to be a
relevant fee-setting consideration is intended to permit clients the
choice of seeking representation from another lawyer whose fee
will not be enhanced by this factor. The Kentucky version of the
rule deletes this requirement.1 °7 Under the Kentucky rule, a client
may not be aware that this factor would justify a larger fee until
the work is completed and the fee charged. 10 8 The deletion works
against the interest of clients in full disclosure regarding fees.1c9

"6 MODEL RULE 1.5(a)(2) (emphasis added). Under certain circumstances the identity
of the client or the nature of the work involved might preclude work by that lawyer for
other clients due to conflict of interest rules. If other remunerative work must be forfeited
in order to accept employment proffered by a client, a higher fee would be justified.
I- KY. RULE 1.5(a), (b). This change was recommended by the Special Committee. See
REPORT OF nm KBA SPECIAL COMMiTrEE, supra note 4, at 11. The committee viewed the
deleted language as "unnecessary." Id. at 15 (committee comment).
"I Indeed, a client might well never recognize that a fee was inflated due to this factor
unless there is sufficient information to reveal the fact. In most situations the inflation of
the fee would not be discernible.
,01 One other change was made by the Kentucky court relative to fees. The ABA's
Model Rules prohibit the use of fees in domestic relations matters where the amount is
contingent upon "the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or
property settlement in lieu thereof." MODEL RULE 1.5(d)(1). The rule clarifies the ambivalent
Code treatment on the subject of contingent fees in domestic relations cases under which
such fees were strongly discouraged but not prohibited. Compare CODE, EC 2-20 with
CODE, DR 2-106(C). The ABA's negative reaction to contingent fees in these matters, under
both the Code and the Model Rules, is premised on the public policy encouraging reconciliation in divorce cases. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at 539. By creating an interest in the
lawyer in seeing the divorce decreed, such fees are viewed as an impediment to reconciliation.
Id.
The Kentucky court provided an exception to the general prohibition on contingent
fees in domestic relations matters, however, when the action is to collect "liquidated sums
in arrearage." KY. RULE 1.5(c)(1). The Special Committee did not urge this change but did
opine that the ABA's rule did not prohibit a contingent fee "to collect an amount that has
been reduced to a judgment." REPORT OF Tm KBA SPECIAL ComTTEE, supra note 4, at
12, 15. Thus, the Kentucky court's version of the rule makes explicit the Special Committee's
reading of the ABA's language.
In the situations covered by the Kentucky court's exception, the rationale for the
prohibition of contingent fees in domestic relations cases does not apply. That is, once a
divorce has been granted and alimony and support awarded, a subsequent suit for delinquent
payments would appear to be indistinguishable from any collection suit. Certainly the
chances of reconciliation of the divorced spouses are not affected by the fee arrangement
between the plaintiff spouse and her or his lawyer in such cases. The Kentucky change,
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Several other Kentucky amendments outside of the fee area
appear detrimental to clients or the public. 110 For example, the
Kentucky court added the requirement of scienter to several pro-

visions in which the ABA had not done so. Most of the ABA's
Model Rules contain no requirement that the conduct proscribed

be intentionally or knowingly committed in order to constitute a
violation."' Generally, the rules prohibit even negligent violations.

therefore, does not violate the public policy served by the ABA rule.
It might be argued, however, that the Kentucky version is detrimental to clients by
providing the impetus for the bar to utilize contingent fees in all such collection cases, even
where they would not be beneficial to the clients. This is a potential problem, however, for
all contingent fee cases, not just those of collection of delinquent alimony and support
payments. The comments to Model Rule 1.5 urge lawyers to utilize contingent fees only
when they benefit clients. MODEL RuE 1.5, Comment [3]. That exhortation would apply
to contingent fees under the Kentucky version of Rule 1.5(c)(1) as well.
110One Kentucky change that is facially detrimental to clients and the public may be
practically insignificant. The Kentucky court amended the ABA rule on client trust accounts
to permit some commingling of lawyers' money with that of clients. Ky. RULE 1.15(d). This
change was recommended by the Special Committee. See REPORT OF THE KBA SPECIAL
COMMITTEE, supra note 4, at 49. Under the Kentucky rule lawyers are permittedto deposit
their own funds in client trust accounts "for the limited purpose of minimizing bank
charges." Ky. RULE 1.15(d); Order of the Kentucky Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 57.
The ABA version of the rule, however, does not permit such deposits of lawyer funds in
trust accounts. MODEL RULE 1.15.
At first glance, the Kentucky approach seems innocuous. Under it, lawyers can avoid
monthly account charges and check writing charges on small accounts by the deposit of a
minimal amount such as $200.00, depending on the bank deposit agreement. At the extreme,
however, the rule appears to permit lawyers to invest greater amounts, such as $1,000.00,
to obtain other bank benefits, such as free checks or other privileges, thus resulting in
substantial commingling of lawyers' and clients' funds.
More significantly, however, the Kentucky approach detracts from a primary rationale
for the client trust account rules, namely the avoidance of even the implication that clients'
property is being misused by their lawyers. Surely there is nothing inherently dishonest
about a lawyer maintaining only one account in which is deposited the lawyer's funds and
those of clients. As long as the funds are distributed properly and not misused while in the
lawyer's possession, there is no moral objection to such commingling. The focus of the
strict Model Rules requirement of separate accounts and records, however, is on the
avoidance of the mere suggestion of misappropriation. The commingling prohibitions work
not only to protect clients against misuse of their funds, but to provide a unified structure
negating even a hint of impropriety. The Kentucky approach is less effective than Model
Rule 1.15 in accomplishing the latter objective.
The Kentucky rule, however, merely continues the practice under the prior Code. See
CODE, DR 9-102(A)(1). Furthermore, there is no evidence of abuse of the banking charge
exception in the state under the Code. The change from the Model Rule, therefore, may
well be insignificant in practical effect.
'" Certainly the willfulness of the violation is considered by the ABA to be relevant
to the decision of whether to impose discipline and the appropriate sanction. MODEL RuLEs,
Preamble: Scope, reprinted in T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 3, at 87 (paragraph
5).
Two scholars suggest that "knowledge" is a requirement of many of the Model Rules
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Kentucky's new rules, in contrast, require knowing violations to
warrant discipline in several instances where the ABA's version
does not. According to the definitions contained in the Model
Rules' "Terminology" section, which was adopted by the Kentucky
court, 12 "knowingly" refers to "actual knowledge of the fact in
question. ' 3 Where the Kentucky rule prohibits only knowing
misconduct, therefore, a lawyer is not subject to discipline for
negligent or even grossly negligent violations. The effect of these
amendments is to restrict the reach of the provisions to fewer

instances of lawyer misconduct.
Most of these changes are found in Part III of the Model

Rules, which governs the lawyer's conduct as an advocate. ABA
Model Rule 3.1, for example, subjects lawyers to discipline for
engaging in frivolous litigation." 4 The Kentucky version only pro-

hibits "knowingly" doing so,"' thus withdrawing from the rule's
6
coverage the careless or even reckless bringing of meritless causes."

by necessary implication. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 16, at 339-40. They maintain,
for example, that a lawyer could not violate MODEL RULE 1.3's requirement of diligence on
behalf of a client unless the lawyer "knew" that he or she had a client. Id. at 340.
The example they choose, however, is not convincing. A lawyer-client relationship,
like other contractual relationships, may be established without the lawyer's subjective
knowledge. If a lawyer had given the purported client reason to believe that a lawyer-client
relationship existed and then failed to act with diligence in regard to the client's matter,
MODEL RuLE 1.3 would appear to be violated. This would be true even though the lawyer
did not "know" that the person was now his or her client. The carelessness of the lawyer
in establishing the lawyer-client relationship might cause a disciplinary authority to forego
discipline or to reduce its severity, but it should not affect the finding of a violation.
The same authors assert that the lawyer's duty to protect the information relating to
the representation of a client under Model Rule 1.6 "assumes that the lawyer is aware that
the information does relate to the representation, but it may not always be clear that the
lawyer has such awareness." Id. This comment also seems to miss the mark. Nothing in
Model Rule 1.6 limits its application to intentional violations. Even careless, though unintentional, violations of protected information fall within the coverage of the rule. To be
sure, a negligent violation of the rule is less deserving of discipline than an intentional
violation. That is not to say that the rule by implication requires a knowing state of mind.
For further discussion of what a lawyer "knows" see C. WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at
695-97.
"2 Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.130(1). The Special Committee recommended the adoption of
the "Terminology" section. See REPORT OF Tam KBA SPECIAL CommIT=E, supra note 4, at
vi.
V KY. RULE 3.130(5).
"1

MODEL

RULE 3.1.

"I Ky. RULE 3.1. The Special Committee did not recommend this amendment. See
REPORT OF THE KBA SPEciAL COMMrrTEE, supra note 4, at 62-63.
116In many instances such carelessness would likely violate Rule 1.1 requiring lawyers
to provide competent representation for a client, and discipline might be imposed for that
violation. Nevertheless, frivolous litigation, whether intentional or the product of negligence,
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Given the current popular criticism of the bar for engaging in
frivolous litigation,11 7 the Kentucky version sends an unfortunate
message to the bar and the public by reducing the scope of Rule
3.1.
A similar objection can be made to the Kentucky court's modification of Model Rule 4.4 governing respect for the rights of
third persons. 118 The Kentucky version prohibits knowingly taking
actions for the purpose of embarrassing or burdening third persons
or violating their rights in gathering evidence, 119 while the ABA
version prohibits carelessly doing so as well. 120 As with Rule 3.1,
the ABA's version of Rule 4.4 more clearly expresses intolerance
21
of such conduct and would have been preferable.
The same can be said for the Kentucky court's insertion of a
scienter requirement in Rules 3.4(d) and (e).122 These rules prohibit
frivolous discovery requests,' 23 unreasonable delay in responding to
discovery requests, 12A and, at trial, alluding to irrelevant or unsupportable matters, expressing personal knowledge about facts in

harms more than just the client. It also harms the judicial system and the public and thus
is appropriately prohibited in the rules' section on the lawyer serving as advocate.
17 Assertions that the judicial system is being overwhelmed by groundless litigation
are common. See, e.g., Partridge, Wilkinson, & Krouse, A Complaint Based on Rumors:
Countering FrivolousLitigation, 31 LOYOLA L. REv. 221, 222 (1985); Note, The Dynamics
of Rule 11: Preventing FrivolousLitigation by Demanding ProfessionalResponsibility, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 300, 300-02 (1986).
"'

MODEL RULE

4.4.

Ky. RULE 4.4. The Special Committee did not recommend this change. See REPORT
OF Tm KBA SPECIAL CommTEE, supra note 4, at 84.
"2 The ABA version contains no scienter requirement. See MODEL RULE 4.4.
121 When one considers the narrow reach of the ABA rule itself, the Kentucky version
seems even more inappropriate. Model Rule 4.4 prohibits conduct by lawyers only when it
has "no substantial purpose other than" to impose upon the rights of third persons. MODEL
RuLE 4.4. Many actions taken by lawyers embarrass and burden third persons or delay
proceedings, but they have other substantial purposes, such as the lawful vindication of a
client's rights. Those actions are not prohibited by the ABA's rule. Model Rule 4.4,
therefore, is violated only in the most egregious situations, that is, when the lawyer cannot
justify his or her actions as serving a lawful purpose. The Kentucky version, however,
narrows the rule's reach even further. It proscribes such abusive conduct only when the
lawyer "knows" that he or she is engaging in it and excuses the lawyer when he or she is
merely careless in doing so. If the court were to determine in a disciplinary proceeding that
a lawyer's conduct had no legitimate substantial purpose justifying abuse of a third party,
the lawyer's successful assertion of his or her own negligence as a defense would be pathetic
indeed.
'2 No similar requirement was included in the Special Committee's report. See REPORT
OF Tm KBA SPECIAL CoMMTE, supra note 4, at 70.
'2 Compare Ky. RusL
3.4(d) (requiring knowing or intentional action) with MODEL
Ru E 3.4(d) (not requiring knowing or intentional action).
"'

12A

Id.
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issue, and asserting personal opinions regarding a matter. 12 Again,

such conduct is clearly detrimental to the judicial process and
should not be tolerated even if it is the product of carelessness.
The acts prohibited by the rule are the sort frequently characterized
as "Rambo" tactics12 6 that have caused numerous courts and bar
associations to enact "rules of professionalism.' 2 7 It is ironic that

the Kentucky Bar Association has approved a set of these rules of
conscience 28 while the state's supreme court has chosen to reduce
the reach of the very disciplinary rules intended to punish and
29
thereby deter such conduct.
Several other significant changes were made to the ABA's

Model Rules. The Kentucky Supreme Court further restricted Model
Rule 3.4's view of fairness to opposing parties and counsel by

deleting the ABA rule's subsection (f).130 Under that provision,

"ICompare KY. RULE 3.4(e) (requiring knowing or intentional action) with
Ru E 3.4(e) (not requiring knowing or intentional action).

MODEL

11 See Samboan, Taming the Loose Cannons: Is Incivility Plaguing the Nation's Bench
and Bar?, National Law Journal,January 15, 1990, page 1. The characterization, of course,
is from the motion picture that depicts a Vietnam veteran showing no mercy to his
opponents. Other characterizations of aggressive lawyerly behavior, such as "playing hardball" or "scorched earth tactics," typically evoke images of either sports or war, two
theatres of endeavor that generally value winning above other virtues.
'2
Several city and state bar associations have issued courtesy codes urging civility
among practicing lawyers. See id. at 22; see also Dondi Properties Corporation v. Commerce
Savings and Loan Assn., 121 F.R.D. 284, 287-88 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (court adopting standards
of practice based on Dallas Bar Association's "Guidelines of Professional Courtesy" and
"Lawyer's Creed" for lawyers appearing in civil actions before it).
In 1988, the ABA House of Delegates issued a "Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism,"
which is reprinted in T. MORoAN & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 3, at 438-39. This body of
aspirational statements was not intended to supersede any of the disciplinary rules applicable
to lawyers. "Professionalism" has become the subject of a movement of sorts among
organized bar associations. The ABA has created a Special Coordinating Committee on
Professionalism with a quarterly publication entitled "The Professional Lawyer." See The
ProfessionalLawyer Spring, 1989, at 2.
121See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CoURTEsY (Kentucky Bar Ass'n 1988).
129The insertion of the requirement of scienter in one other subsection of Rule 3.4
may be of less consequence. In the ABA's version of the rule, it is a violation to "falsify
evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness
that is prohibited by law." MODEL RULE 3.4(b). The Kentucky court, however, amended
the provision to apply only when such acts were done "knowingly or intentionally," KY.
RULE 3.4(b), although the Special Committee had not recommended the insertion. See
REPORT OF THE KBA SPEcALk CommrrrEE, supra note 4, at 70. Presumably, however, the
requirement of the lawyer's knowledge and intention is implicated by the unlawfulness of
the conduct proscribed in the Model Rule. The Kentucky change, therefore, appears inconsequential.
110A new subsection (f) on another subject, however, is substituted by the Kentucky
court. KY. RULE 3.4(f). This new subsection (f)prohibits the use or the threat of the use
of the criminal or disciplinary process to gain an advantage in a civil or criminal proceeding.
Id. For further discussion of this provision, see supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
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lawyers were not to request that non-client witnesses refrain from
talking to opposing parties, except under certain circumstances in
which the witnesses' interests might be aligned with those of the
client. 1 The ABA version was an attempt to make the adversary
process fairer to all participants by removing barriers to the full
accessibility of facts. The restriction also serves the judicial process
in facilitating the search for truth in the garnering of evidence. 132
Kentucky's deletion of the ABA's subsection (f) foregoes those
advantages and leaves intact the adversarial race to locate and
thereafter to silence witnesses. The deletion appears to favor gamesmanship over the ultimate search for truth.
The Kentucky court also deleted another limit on a lawyer's
adversariness found in the ABA's Model Rules. Under Model Rule
4.1(b), lawyers are required to disclose material facts to third
persons when that disclosure is "necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act by a client," unless that disclosure is
prohibited by Model Rule 1.6 on confidentiality.13 The rule thus
furthers the prohibition in Model Rule 1.2(d) against assisting
clients "in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. 1 34 The two rules work together to require the disassociation
of lawyers from the criminal and fraudulent actions of their clients.
Nevertheless, the Kentdcky court retained the broad prohibition on
assisting clients in such activities 35 while deleting the disclosure
obligation. 36 It is understandable, however, that the court was
dissatisfied with the ABA version of the rule. That rule's disclosure
obligation has been criticized as meaningless 37 because it does not
apply when disclosure requires the revelation of confidential information under the broad reaches of Model Rule 1.6.138 In fact,
scholars have had to resort to convoluted "saving constructions"
to make any sense of the ABA version of Model Rule. 4.1(b) given
this broad exception. 139 Despite the controversy surrounding the
". MODEL RuLE 3.4(f).

32 The rule thus furthers the general prohibition on obstruction of justice that is

reiterated as an ethical standard by MODEL RuLE 3.4(a).
"'

MODEL RuLE 4.1(b).

MODEL RuJ.E 1.2(d).
13s
KY. RuLE 1.2(d).
136Compare Ky. RuLE 4.1 with MODEL RuLE 4.1(a), (b). The deletion was recommended by the Special Committee. See REPORT OF Tm KBA SPECIAL CoMMITTEE, supra
'3

note 4, at 70, 82.
"'

C. WOLFRAM,supra note 9, at 672, 724.

131

See MODEL RuLE 4.1(b).

139

See G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 16, at 425-26, 428-31.
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ABA's adoption of Model Rule 4.1(b),y4 however, its-deletion by
the Kentucky court is regrettable. It would have been preferable
for the court to delete the exception to the disclosure obligation
rather than to abandon the obligation altogether. As it stands, the
court's action leaves unclear the proper course of conduct when a
lawyer becomes aware that a client is defrauding another. The key
question presented is whether the lawyer's mere silence serves to
assist the known fraud of a client. The answer of the ABA version
of the rule is unclear, at least without a strained interpretation of
the rules. 41 The Kentucky court's deletion of the disclosure require42
ment, however, seems to answer that question in the negative.
This approach unfortunately prefers the client's interests at the
expense of those defrauded.
The overall public interest was further sacrificed to adversariness by the Kentucky court's treatment of the rules governing
prosecutors. 43 Most notably, the court deleted the ABA rule's
prohibition on prosecutors seeking to obtain waivers of important
rights from unrepresented defendants and potential defendants.'"
Kentucky's new rule encourages the use of prosecutorial pressure
to facilitate conviction at the expense of the rights of those accused.
Unfortunately, Kentucky's deletion implies that the prosecutor's
duty as an advocate supersedes his duty to ensure the fairness of
the proceeding, despite the court's statement to the contrary in the
rule's comment.Y5 While the public might be comforted by the
thought of more convictions, the court should recognize the more
compelling public interest in the protection of the procedural rights
of those accused of crimes.

See id. at 423-26, 428-31.
1-1 See id. at 425-26, 428-31; C. WoLFRAm, supra note 9, at 724.
342 The argument can be made, however, that the Kentucky court's deletion of Model
Rule 4.1(b) was inconsequential. The ABA's Comment to Model Rule 4.4 indicates that
140

subsection (b) "recognizes that substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose certain
information to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud." Comment

to MODEL RrLE 4.1 (paragraph 3). If other law does require such disclosures, a Kentucky
lawyer would be required to disclose without the presence of Rule 4.1(b). While this portion

of the ABA's Comment to Model Rule 4.1 was deleted by the Kentucky court, substantive
law requiring disclosure would still have that effect.
,4' Model Rule 3.8 is the only provision specifically addressed to the lawyer as prose-

cutor. Nevertheless, prosecutors, like all other lawyers, must comply with the other rules of
ethical conduct to the extent they are applicable.
44 Compare Ky. RuLE 3.8(c) with MODEL RuLE 3.8(c). The deletion was not urged by
the Special Committee. See REPORT OF THE KBA SPEcIAL CommrrME, supra note 4, at 78.
" Ky. RutL 3.8 comment (paragraph 1).
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Finally, the Kentucky court also relaxed the ABA's prohibition
on lawyers seeking to avoid appointments by tribunals to represent
individuals.'4 The ABA version of Rule 6.2 prohibited lawyers
from trying to avoid such appointments except for good cause. 47
Kentucky's new rule merely discourages lawyers from trying to
avoid court appointments.' 41 While the practical effect of the change
might not be great, 49 the Kentucky rule indicates that less is
expected of lawyers in this state in terms of public interest obligations than elsewhere.
The significant changes made by the Kentucky Supreme Court
to the ABA's Model Rules display an unfortunate pattern. Almost
exclusively they are more lenient to lawyers at the expense of the
interests of clients and the public than are the ABA's rules. Furthermore, Kentucky's pro-lawyer version of the rules, issued when
the public's confidence in lawyers is so low, should be an embarrassment to the profession. 5 0 A more favorable reaction by the
Kentucky court to the duties of lawyers adopted by the ABA in

" Several additional changes were made by the Kentucky court to the ABA Model
Rules. In the field of advertising, the court retained its special, detailed treatment in a
separate rule, SCR 3.135, Ky. Rtu 7.2. This change was recommended by the Special
Committee. See REPORT OF mau KBA SPEcL. CommErrra, supra note 4, at 98-99. Since the
regulation of lawyer advertising will continue the pre-Model Rules practice, further discussion is not provided here.
The ABA's Model Rule on solicitation, MODEL RULE 7.3, was not adopted by the
court due to the action of the U.S. Supreme Court in Kentucky Bar Assn. v. Shapero, 486
U.S. 466 (1988), in which the ABA's treatment was held to be an unconstitutional infringement on commercial speech. Id. at 466. The ABA has since adopted new Model Rules
7.2(a) and 7.3 to comply with Shapero. See T. MORAN. & R. RoTuNDA, supra note 3, at
168-69. The Kentucky court notes only in its order that it is drafting a new rule in place
of Model Rule 7.3. Order of the Kentucky Supreme Court, supra note 1,at 95.
The Kentucky court also chose to delete the portion of Model Rule 7.5(a) that permitted
lawyers to practice under a trade name. Ky. RuLE 7.5(a). The Special Committee had not
recommended this deletion, although it had inserted a requirement that the trade name be
filed with the state bar association. See REPORT OF T=E KBA SPECiAL CoammrrE, supra
note 4, at 105, 107. For most Kentucky practitioners the deletion will not be viewed as
significant, although for some the restriction will impair their marketing flair.
"4 MODEL RULE 6.2.
", Again, the Kentucky court substituted "should" for "shall". Ky. RuL
6.2. The
Special Committee did not recommend the change. See REPORT OF TBm KBA SPECIAL
CommTTEE, supra note 4, at 94.
4,"
Professor Wolfram notes that court appointments frequently tend to fall to the
same lawyers who have indicated a willingness to take such cases. C. WOLFRAM, supra note
9, at 951-52.
" A federal judge has recently noted a poll that ranked lawyers below funeral directors
in public esteem. Rymer, High Road, Low Road: Legal Professionat the Crossroads, TRIAL,
Oct., 1989, 79, 79.
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its Model Rules may have helped the public image of the state's
lawyers considerably.

III.

KENTUCKY'S

Two CRrivcAL DELETIONS

The Kentucky Supreme Court made two critical changes to the
ABA's Model Rules. Both are startling in their rejection of longestablished principles of legal ethics. While the deletion of the two
rules may have little impact on the actual discipline of Kentucky
lawyers, their absence is of critical symbolic importance. The message that they send the public threatens to undermine the substantial gains obtained by the court in its adoption of the new rules.
A.

The Duty to Disclose Adverse Law

The court chose to delete ABA Model Rule 3.3(a)(3), which
requires a lawyer "to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse
to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel. '"151 The rule restricts the duty of the lawyer as a zealous
advocate. It places the lawyer's obligation of candor to the court
above the lawyer's duty of zeal on behalf of the client when it is
apparent that the court may be proceeding under a misimpression
regarding the controlling law. At first glance, therefore, the obligation appears to be a severe infringement on the adversary process.
Indeed, during the open hearings on the proposed rules the
disclosure obligation of Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) received considerable
52
comment to that effect from practicing lawyers in Kentucky.
Many of those so commenting were surprised 5 3 to learn that an
identical rule' 54 had been part of the Kentucky law of legal ethics
"I Compare MODEL RULE 3.3(a)(3) with KY. RULE 3.3. This deletion was not recommended by the Special Committee. See REPORT OF Tim KBA SPEcIAL ComMITTEE, supra
note 4, at 65.
Only one other state has no rule comparable to Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) or its identical
Code counterpart, DR 7-106(B)(1). California's rules prohibit making false statements of
law to the court and knowingly citing as authority invalid statutory or case law. CALIFoRNIA
RULE 5-200(B), (D), T. MoRo & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 3, at 254-55. The rule, however,
contains no duty to disclose harmful legal authority when opposing counsel has failed to
do so.
"52Interview with Professor Richard H. Underwood, chairman of the Kentucky Bar
Association's select committee that proposed the adoption of the Model Rules, in Lexington,
Kentucky (March 5, 1990).
153 Id.
"4 CODE, DR 7-106(B)(1).
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since the state supreme court's adoption of the Code in 1969.' 55
An argument can even be made that such a disclosure obligation
15

has existed in Kentucky since at least the turn of the century.

Those who criticize Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) as an unwarranted
intrusion into the functioning of the adversary system generally fail
157
In
to recognize how narrow its disclosure obligation really is.
order for a lawyer to be obligated to reveal law adverse to the
client it must be from "the controlling jurisdiction."'' 58 Law from
other jurisdictions, no matter how persuasive, is not within the

M"
See supra notes

10-13 and accompanying text.
The ABA's 1908 Canons included a provision that called for "candor and fairness"
in conduct before a court and with other lawyers. 1908 Canons, supra note 7, Canon 22,
reprinted in T. MORGAN & R. ROTuNDA, supra note 3, at 421-22. The provision did not
expressly require disclosure of adverse legal authority when an opponent had failed to do
so. It did, however, prohibit misquoting authorities, using invalid law, misconstruing facts,
and attempting improperly to influence a jury. Canon 22 concluded with the statement that
"[t]hese and all kindred practices are unprofessional and unworthy of an officer of the law
charged, as is the lawyer, with the duty of aiding in the administration of justice." Id.
In 1935 and again in 1949, the ABA issued ethics opinions that read Canon 22 as
requiring a lawyer's disclosure of legal authority adverse to the lawyer's*client when an
opponent had overlooked it. Opinion 280 (June 18, 1949), 35 A.B.A. J. 876 (1949); Opinion
146 (July 17, 1935), 22 A.B.A. J. 263 (1936). In fact, the 1949 opinion interpreted that
obligation as including legal authority that was not only directly adverse but that which a
court should obviously consider in deciding the case.
Interestingly, the Kentucky Bar Association's first effort at codifying the subject of
legal ethics, the 1903 KBA Code, supra note 5, contained a provision remarkably similar
to the ABA's subsequent Canon 22. Rule 5 of the 1903 code also required of lawyers
"candor and fairness" in dealing with courts and other lawyers. 1903 KBA CODE, supra
note 5, at 12. The provision expressly prohibited the knowing use of overruled or repealed
legal authority and declared that "all kindred practices are deceits and evasions unworthy
of attorneys." Id.
If, as the ABA opinions concluded, Canon 22 of the ABA's 1908 Canons required the
disclosure of adverse legal authority when an opponent failed to note it, the argument can
be made that the nearly identical Rule 5 of the 1903 KBA Code did the same. This would
allow the tracing of the duty to disclose in Kentucky back to the turn of the century.
"I See Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 57-58, 68-69
(1989). In that article, the author maintains that the duty to reveal adverse legal authority
under Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) is too narrow for a profession that calls itself officers of the
court. Id. at 88. Additionally, the author argues that a similar disclosure obligation should
apply to adverse facts, at least in civil litigation. Id. at 88-89. These assertions, of course,
are more controversial than the narrow disclosure obligation found in Model Rule 3.3(a)(3),
and many within the legal profession would find such expansions of that obligation to be
too detrimental to the lawyer's role as zealous advocate. Nevertheless, the Kentucky court's
deletion of any disclosure obligation regarding adverse legal authority is overly protective
of that role.
The arguments against an expansion of the disclosure obligation beyond the reach of
Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) and DR 7-106(B)(1) are stated in Tunstall, Ethics in Citation:A Plea
for Re-Interpretation of a Canon, 35 A.B.A. J. 5 (1949) (arguing for a narrowing of ABA
Opinion 146 along the lines of Model Rule 3.3(a)(3)).
"'

"z MODEL

RutE 3.3(a)(3).
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reach of the obligation. Moreover, the law must be "directly
adverse to the position of the client." 1 9 A lawyer need not disclose
law that is merely analogous or that only contains instructive dicta,
regardless of how helpful it might be to the judge. 160 Lawyers
skilled in distinguishing authorities usually have little difficulty in
perceiving law to be less than "directly adverse" unless it is obvi6
ously so. Additionally, the lawyer must know of the adverse law.' '
No violation of Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) occurs for failing, even
unreasonably, to know the law.
Finally, the obligation only applies when a matter is before a
tribunal.' 62 No obligation exists to disclose adverse law to an opposing party when a matter is not before a tribunal, as in negotiations or business transactions. 63 Taken cumulatively, the
requirements for the duty to disclose under the Model Rules render
the obligation quite limited. 64 Given the further fact that most
lawyers recognize that sound tactics compel an advocate to deal
with adverse law directly rather than hoping for an opponent's
negligent omission, it is unlikely that the rule would be the subject
65
of discipline in many cases.'
Narrow as the obligation is, it is an important component of
legal ethics. From the public's standpoint, the obligation works to
prevent wrong decisions in those rare cases when it is applicable.
Those erroneous decisions may engender costly, unnecessary appeals or, worse, confuse the state of the law in some cases. 66 The
failure to correct a tribunal's misimpressions regarding the appli-

1"9Id.
'16 As mentioned, supra note 156, the ABA interpreted the lawyer's disclosure obliga-

tion under Canon 22 of the 1908 Canons more broadly to encompass not just "controlling
authorities," but also legal authority that "would reasonably be considered important by
the judge sitting on the case." 35 A.B.A. J. 876 (1949). These opinions are referred to in
the footnotes accompanying the Code's counterpart to Model Rule 3.3(a)(3). CODE, DR 7106(B)(1), n.79. That broader view of the disclosure obligation was not made part of either
DR 7-106(B)(1) or Model Rule 3.3(a)(3), nor was it mentioned by the ABA in its comment
to the Model Rule. MODEL RuLE 3.3(A)(3) Comment (paragraph 3).
161 MODEL RuLE 3.3(a)(3).
162Id.
163 For example, when an opponent has apparently overlooked some case law or statute
that would be advantageous to his or her client.
164 The difficult interpretive issues of the disclosure obligation are noted in C. WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at 681-82.
1 Id. at 682.
166 Professor Wolfram notes, however, that many occasions in which disclosure would
be called for, such as evidentiary rulings, such disclosure would have little or no precedential
effect. Id.
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cable law could have effects beyond the outcome for the parties to
the action. Further, the disclosure obligation fosters trust between
the courts and lawyers appearing before them. A judge who reached
an erroneous conclusion because a lawyer silently allowed him or
her to apply the wrong law would legitimately feel betrayed by the
lawyer. 167
Finally, the obligation to advise the court that it is about to

decide a case upon a misimpression of the law, even though the
court's error will benefit the lawyer's client, must be considered a
1 68
fundamental part of the lawyer's duty as an "officer of the court."'
While lawyers like to refer to themselves as "officers of the
court,"' 169 the label is surely without substantive meaning if lawyers
can knowingly remain silent as a court mistakenly applies the wrong
1 70
law to a case.
It is not likely that many Kentucky lawyers would have been
disciplined for a failure to disclose adverse legal authority had the
Kentucky court adopted Model Rule 3.3(a)(3). No lawyers were
disciplined under the identical provision during the twenty years of

161Indeed, the ABA's interpretation of Canon 22 of the 1908 Canons to include a
similar disclosure obligation utilized the judge's possible sense of betrayal as a standard for
determining whether disclosure was required. See ABA Opinion 280 (June 18, 1949), 35
A.B.A. J. 876 (1949) ("Would a reasonable judge properly feel that a lawyer who advanced,
as the law, a proposition adverse to the undisclosed decision, was lacking in candor and
fairness to him? Might the judge consider himself misled by an implied representation that
the lawyer knew of no adverse authority?") (emphasis added).
To be sure, the misimpression would not be the sole fault of the lawyer failing to
disclose. It would initially be the result of the opponent's carelessness or neglect and perhaps
the product of similar inattentiveness on the part of the judge or the judge's law clerk. C.
WoLFRAm, supra note 9, at 682. In that way, the disclosure obligation operates to "punish"
the innocent trial lawyer who has carefully prepared a case and now finds herself obligated
to help make the case for the opposing counsel. The opposing lawyer, however, would be
subject to discipline under Model Rule 1.1, which requires lawyers to provide competent
representation to their clients. MODEL RuiLE 1.1.
I" For discussion of the legitimacy of the profession's use of the characterization of
lawyers as "officers of the court," see Gaetke, supra note 157.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 88-89. It is unlikely that the Kentucky Supreme Court intended by its deletion
1'
of Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) to be redefining broadly the role of lawyers to be zealous advocates
to the exclusion of their role as officers of the court. The court adopted the ABA's version
of Model Rule 3.3(a)(4), which requires disclosure of client perjury, and Model Rule 3.3(d),
which mandates the disclosure of all material facts, whether adverse to the client or not, in
ex parte proceedings. See KY. RULE 3.3(a)(3), (d). Both rules expand the duty of lawyers
as officers of the court beyond what it was under the Code. See T. MoRGAN & R. ROTUNDA,
supra note 3, at 145 ("Model Code Comparison"). The court's motives in deleting Model
Rule 3.3(a)(3), therefore, seem rule-specific rather than a part of a broader rejection of the
role of lawyers as officers of the court.
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the Code's applicability in the state.17 ' Still, the deletion of the rule
sends an unfortunate message to lawyers and the public. The clear
implication is that the role of officer of the court is less important
to the court now than it was under the Code. While the practice
of law in the state is not likely to be greatly affected by the deletion,
the public's view of lawyers will slip a bit further as a result.
B.

The Duty to Report Ethical Violations

Even more disturbing than the deletion of Model Rule 3.3(a)(3)
is the Kentucky Supreme Court's deletion of the requirement that
lawyers report serious ethical violations committed by other lawyers. 72 Under ABA Model Rule 8.3, lawyers are to report to the
appropriate disciplinary authority their knowledge of unethical conduct by another lawyer that "raises a substantial question as to
that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects ' 173 unless reporting would involve disclosure of con,7'Nationally,

Professor Wolfram reaches essentially the same conclusion. C. WOLF-

RAM, supra note 9, at 681.

,7 The Kentucky court deleted in its entirety Model Rule 8.3 which provides:
(a) A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation
of the rules of professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to
that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects,
shall inform the appropriate professional authority.
(b) A lawyer having knowledge that a judge has committed a violation of
applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the
judge's fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.
(c) This rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected
by Rule 1.6.
MODEL RULE 8.3. This deletion was not recommended by the Special Committee. See
REPORT OF TH= KBA SPECIAL COiMrTTEE, supra note 4, at 109.
Only three other jurisdictions are without provisions on reporting violations of other
lawyers: California, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia. ABA/BNA LAWYER'S
MANUAL, supra note 20, at 101:201. For a description of other states' variations on the
reporting requirement, see id. at 101:201-02.
For a general discussion of the duty to report other lawyers' misconduct and the scant
case law on that duty, see id. at 101:201-08.
271 MODEL RULE 8.3. The prior Code, applicable in Kentucky since 1969,
contained a
broader mandatory reporting rule. It provided that a lawyer with unprivileged knowledge
of a violation of a Code provision "shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other
authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation." DR 1-103(A). It will be
noted that Model Rule 8.3(a) requires reporting only in the case of more serious ethical
violations while the obligation defined by the Code provision extends to all violations.
Even the 1908 Canons, supra note 7, adopted by the Kentucky court in 1946, urged
reporting of ethical violations. See supra note 6. Canons 28, 29, 1908 Canons, reprinted in
T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, supranote 3, at 424. For a discussion of the reporting obligation
under these Canons, see Note, The "Stool Pigeon" Canons:A Comment on Certain Sections
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fidential information. 74 The Kentucky court chose to eliminate this
obligation, leaving the reporting of fellow lawyers' misconduct
purely to the conscience of each lawyer.

Much like the rule on disclosing adverse legal authority, the
adoption of Model Rule 8.3 would not likely have resulted in a
significant change in the practice of law in Kentucky. The broader

Code provision mandating reporting of other lawyers' misconduct
generated few lawyer complaints7 6 75 and was largely ignored in the
discipline of Kentucky lawyers.'
Nevertheless, the deletion is regrettable. From the public's viewpoint, the absence of a reporting requirement undermines the effectiveness of the planned operation of the disciplinary process.

Among the various participants in the legal process, lawyers are
the most informed regarding legal ethics and the most likely to be
77
aware of the misconduct of lawyers involved in a given matter.
Thus, lawyers collectively are the best source of informed complaints about lawyers' misconduct. The deletion of the reporting
requirement reduces the likelihood that lawyers will file complaints,
even regarding the worst unethical conduct by other lawyers. The
presence of a reporting requirement causes some conscientious

of Canons 28 and 29 of the ABA Code of Ethics, 41 CoNN. B. J. 339 (1967).
Even the 1903 KBA Code of Legal Ethics included a reporting provision. It declared
that lawyers "should fearlessly expose before the proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest
conduct in the profession .... 1903 KBA Code, supra note 5, at 13.
",4
MODEL RuLE 8.3(c).
,71
One disciplinary authority in the state estimates that only 15 to 20 complaints are
filed by lawyers each year. Address by Barbara Rea, Deputy Bar Counsel, Kentucky Bar
Association, University of Kentucky Legal Profession Seminar (February 27, 1990). In
reference to the national situation, Professor Wolfram declares that "[p]robably no other
professional requirement is as widely ignored by lawyers subject to it." C. WoLFRAM, supra
note 9, at 683; see also Gressman, Inherent Judicial Power and DisciplinaryDue Process,
18 SETON HALL L. RPv. 541, 541 n.1 (1988) (the reluctance of lawyers to report misconduct
of other lawyers has been a major problem in lawyer discipline).
176 No Kentucky cases indicating a violation of DR 1-103(A), the reporting requirement
under that body of law, are to be found.
'"nNot all misconduct occurs in open court. Lawyers to business transactions, negotiations, mediations, and other matters may be the only participants who recognize the
misconduct of other lawyer participants involved.
In order for a client to complain about the misconduct of a lawyer, two decisions
must be made. The client must conclude that the lawyer's act was problematic and the
client must decide to respond by filing a complaint. Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients,
and ProfessionalRegulation, 1976 Am. B. FouND. Ras. J. 919, at 948. Whether clients will
make both of these decisions is determined by a number of factors. Id. Ignorance of the
law of legal ethics and of the availability of the disciplinary mechanism are among those
factors. In this regard, lawyers are better sources of complaints.
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lawyers to file complaints when they otherwise would not.' 78 Assuming that the disciplinary process is important to the public, the

Kentucky court's action conflicts with the public interest by making
the system less effective.
From the viewpoint of the profession, the deletion of the

reporting requirement should be equally alarming. Lawyers generally describe themselves as being members of a self-regulating
profession. 179 Numerous commentators have referred to the presence of self-regulation as a necessary prerequisite for any field

claiming to be a "profession.' '180 Self-regulation is generally viewed
as being beneficial to lawyers in insulating the profession from
regulation by other, less friendly bodies, such as state legislatures
or the Federal Trade Commission.' 8' To the public it must be hard
to imagine the rationale for calling the practice of law a self-

regulating profession when lawyers are perfectly free to remain
silent even in the face of grossly unethical conduct on the part of

other lawyers. The court's deletion of the reporting requirement
lends support to some critics of the legal profession who assert

that self-regulation by lawyers is a myth and the profession should
yield to legislative control.182 It would seem that lawyers' own selfinterest would cause them to be wary of changes to their code of

173

Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's Unethical Violations in

the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. Rnv. 977, 992.
119
See, e.g., Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is It SelfRegulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L. FoRum 193, 193-94; Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer
Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEo. L.J. 705, 707-08 (1981); Powell, ProfessionalDivestiture: The Cession of Responsibility for Lawyer Discipline, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. Ras. J.
31.
,"o
C. WOL-RAm, supra note 9, at 14-15; Powell, supra note 179, at 31-32; Watson,
Canons as Guides to Action: Trustworthy or Treacherous, 33 TENN. L. REv. 162, 163-64
(1966). For a general discussion of the origin and rationale of self-regulation of the legal
profession, see C. WoLFRAM, supra note 9, at 20-22; Steele & Nimmer, supra note 177, at
921-24.
I,See Testimony on the Reauthorization of the Federal Trade Commission, Hearings
on S.1078m Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism of the
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 1985 (Testimony of J. Chrys
Dougherty, American Bar Association) (The FTC should exercise no regulation of lawyers
because they are "regulated very extensively, regulated by state bars, the agency of the
Supreme Court in 31 jurisdictions. This is duplicative regulation and there is no need for
it . .
").
"8 A particularly prominent organization of such critics is HALT, an Organization of
Americans for Legal Reform. That organization maintains that there is in inherent conflict
of interest in self-regulation by lawyers that is harmful to consumers of legal services.
Ostberg, The Conflict of Interest in Lawyer Self-Regulation, 1 THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER
6, at 6 (Summer, 1989). HALT urges that the state legislatures create the standards and the
executive enforce them. Id. at 9.
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ethics that call public attention to any weakness of the profession's
self-regulation.
The arguments against the imposition of a reporting requirement are weak. Lawyers dislike the thought of policing their fellow
practitioners. 183 Some insist that the requirement places lawyers in
the awkward position of having to judge the conduct of their
opponents and even their colleagues. 184 Yet lawyers are quite willing
to "judge" other lawyers for any number of purposes as long as
it serves their own private interests or those of their clients. They
judge the legality of their opponents' discovery demands.' 85 They
judge opposing lawyers' conduct for purposes of appeals from
lower court decisions. 8 6 They judge actions taken by opponents
for purposes of pursuing sanctions. 18 7 All these judgments involve
the lawyer's evaluation of whether another lawyer's conduct comports with the law. The reporting requirement of Model Rule 8.3
merely expects such judgment to further the public interest.
The argument can be made that the Kentucky deletion of the
reporting requirement simply reflects the reality of the national
experience under the Code's reporting requirement. That experience, it is said, engenders cynicism among practicing lawyers because the obligation is seldom enforced by bar disciplinary
189
authorities, 8 8 and this cynicism spills over to other rules as well.
Even if these assertions are accurate, surely they do not justify the
deletion of the requirement. 19° Instead, they call for a renewed
"IA

similar reluctance on the part of lawyers to report their fellow lawyers under the
1908 Canons, supra note 7, is discussed in detail in Note, supra note 173, at 347-49.
- This point was made by Frank Haddad, a member of the Special Committee that
recommended the adoption of the Model Rules in Kentucky, in defense of the Kentucky
court's deletion of the reporting requirement. The Louisville Courier-Journal,February 26,
1990, at A8, col. 1. The Special Committee itself, however, did not recommend the deletion
of the reporting requirement. See supra note 4, at 109.
M Part of a lawyer's responsibility to his or her client when faced with a discovery
demand is to determine whether the Rules of Civil Procedure require the disclosure of the
information sought.
I" For example, appeals in criminal cases are commonly based on allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct.
I" Decisions about whether to seek sanctions under Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure are based on an evaluation of the actions taken by opposing counsel.
38 See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
" This argument is noted in G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 16, at 555-56; see
also Note, supra note 173, at 348-49.
"9 Professor Hazard has urged a broad reconsideration of the mandatory reporting
rule. Hazard, "Squeal Rule" Consideredfor Change, THE NATIONAL LAW JouRNAL (March
26, 1990) at 14. He suggests that lawyers be granted greater discretion in reporting fellow
lawyers than under the present Code and Model Rules approaches but does not favor the
repeal of the requirement. Id.
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effort on the part of the courts to see that the rule is enforced.
Certain evidence exists that just such an interest may be emerging

in some states. 191 Regrettably, the Kentucky court has chosen a
different path.
Worst, perhaps, is the court's failure even to include in the

Kentucky rules a provision simply encouraging the reporting of
ethical violations known to lawyers. 192 In a number of other provisions the court chose to rely upon mere exhortation where the
ABA had imposed a duty. 193 Two possible explanations exist for

the court's failure to do so in the case of Model Rule 8.3. One is
that the court views lawyers as having little responsibility for the
regulation of their profession. The other is that the court feels that
even exhorting the state's lawyers to report ethical violations will
fail. If either explanation is accurate, perhaps the critics urging
legislative regulation of the profession are right.
CONCLUSION

The Kentucky Supreme Court made a significant improvement
in Kentucky's law of legal ethics by adopting the ABA's Model

' See Rotunda, supra note 178, at 992.
One indication of a possible new interest in disciplining lawyers for failing to report
their fellow lawyers is the Illinois supreme court's recent decision in In re Himmel, 533
N.E.2d 790 (Ill.
1988). In Himmel, a client hired James H. Himmel as her attorney to try
to collect money that her former attorney, John R. Casey, had converted during his prior
representation of her. In reaching a settlement with Mr. Casey, the client agreed not to
institute any civil, criminal, or disciplinary action against him. The client specifically
instructed Mr. Himmel not to take any similar action against Mr. Casey. When the
settlement agreement was not honored by Mr. Casey, Mr. Himmel brought suit and was
awarded a judgment in excess of the settlement amount. Prior to the client's hiring of Mr.
Himmel, she had contacted the state's disciplinary'authority about the conduct of Mr.
Casey, but whether the client reported Mr. Casey's name to the commission remained in
question. Id. at 791. The state supreme court held that the question of whether the client
informed the state disciplinary authority was irrelevant and imposed a one-year suspension
upon Mr. Himmel for his failure to report the conduct of Mr. Casey. Id. at 796.
The Himmel case is soundly criticized by Professor Rotunda. See Rotunda, supra note
178, at 985-97. Professor Rotunda is particularly critical of the Himmel case's narrow
interpretation of the exception to the reporting requirement for "privileged" information.
Id. at 986-91. One can disagree with the particular outcome in Himmel, however, and still
be in favor of the proper enforcement of a reporting requirement in general.
9 The Washington Supreme Court chose this approach in adopting the Model Rules.
Rule 8.3(a), (b), Rules of Professional Conduct, Vol O, Revised Code of Washington
(1987).
19,
See, e.g., KY. RuLn 1.4(a), (b) (ABA Model Rule's duty to communicate reasonably
with a client changed to an exhortation to do so); Ky. RuLE 6.2 (ABA Model Rule's duty
not to seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except for good cause
changed to an exhortation not to do so).
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Rules of Professional Conduct. The new rules, for the most part,
are better in form and substance than the prior Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Kentucky court's amendments to the Model Rules, however, are not without their problems. The significant changes emphatically favor lawyers rather than clients or the public and alter
the role of the ethical lawyer envisioned by the ABA in its Model
Rules.
Most discouraging is the court's deletion of two long-established principles of legal ethics, namely the duty of a lawyer to
reveal certain adverse legal authority when an opponent has failed
to do so and the duty of a lawyer to report serious unethical
conduct by fellow lawyers. Both obligations were part of the lawyer's duties under the prior Code, and both remain obligations in
nearly all other states. Their deletion sends an unfortunate message
to the profession and to the people of Kentucky. Their absence
suggests that lawyers in Kentucky have fewer duties to the accomplishment of justice and to the regulation of legal ethics.
The definition of legal ethics is not a static process. The obligations of lawyers to their clients, the courts, and the public should
always be subject to review, discussion, and amendment. Hopefully
this process will result in a reconsideration of these two critical
deletions. The public image of lawyers could only be helped by
such an effort.
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